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Summary 
Vertical restrictions and especially price restriction has generally been 
deemed anticompetitive during the years, both in the US as well as in the 
EU. Minimum resale price maintenance has a long history of being seen as 
anti-competitive. In the USA there has been a per se illegality regarding 
RPM for almost a hundred years under the Sherman Act section 2. 
However, in the last decades there has been a change in the attitude towards 
RPM, starting with prominent economists arguing that the per se illegality 
was without grounds. This development started in the 60s, with the Chicago 
School as the vanguard for this crusade. It has been an ongoing development 
which culminated in the removal of the per se illegality in Leegin, where the 
Supreme Court substituted it with the Rule of Reason. 
 
In the European Union there has been a similar development. This however 
has not lead to a similar result. RPM, as a vertical restraint has always been 
seen as anticompetitive and even now after the development in the USA and 
a similar loosening of the snare around vertical restraint in the EU there is a 
quite harsh presumption of illegality. 
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between resale price maintenance 
(RPM) and consumer welfare. The thesis shows that there is a solid role for 
consumer welfare within competition law. While it does not have the status 
that it has in the US antitrust system but is still very present, especially at a 
practical level. 
 
The thesis continues to investigate different economic theories regarding the 
effects of minimum RPM and clearly shows an ambiguity regarding the 
theoretical effects. In lack of empirical evidence as well as theoretical 
support for a general presumption of illegality towards RPM this thesis 
concludes that the appropriate approach would be a removal of the status as 
a hard core restriction and said presumption and by moving towards the US 
Rule of Reason approach through a pure application of Article 101(3). 
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Sammanfattning 
Vertikala restriktioner och särskilt sådana gällande pris har i allmänhet 
ansetts ha negativa effekter på konkurrens under en lång tid, både i USA och 
i EU. Prisgolv har en lång historia av att ses som konkurrensbegränsande. I 
USA har det setts som per se olagligt i nästan hundra år under Sherman Act 
avsnitt 2. Under de senaste decennierna har det dock skett en förändring i 
synen på prisgolv, som börjar med att framstående ekonomer argumenterade 
att olagligheten var grundlös. Denna utveckling startade på 60-talet, med 
Chicagoskolan som förtrupp för denna kampanj. Det har varit en pågående 
utveckling som kulminerade i fallet Leegin där högsta domstolen ersatte per 
se olagligheten den med en tillämpning av Rule of Reason doktrinen. 
 
Inom EU har det skett en liknande utveckling. Detta har emellertid inte lett 
till ett liknande resultat. Prisgolv, som en vertikal restriktion har alltid setts 
som konkurrensbegränsande och även nu efter utvecklingen i USA och en 
liknande förändring åt att se mer positivt på vertikala restriktioner så finns 
fortfarande en stark presumtion om illegalitet gällande prisgolv. 
 
Denna uppsats undersöker sambandet mellan prisgolv och konsumenternas 
välfärd. Avhandlingen visar konsumenternas välfärd har en stark plats i 
bedömningen inom konkurrensrätten. Även om den inte har den status som 
den har i den amerikanska konkurrensrätten, så är den fortfarande mycket 
närvarande, särskilt på en praktisk nivå. 
 
Avhandlingen fortsätter att undersöka olika ekonomiska teorier om 
effekterna av prosgolv och tydligt visar en tvetydighet när det gäller dessa. I 
brist på empiriska bevis och teoretiskt stöd för en allmän presumtion om 
olaglighet mot prisgolv så finner denna avhandling att en lämplig metod 
skulle vara ett borttagande av statusen som en allvarlig restriktion och 
nämnda presumtion. Istället skall man röra sig mot en tillämpning av den 
Amerikanska Rule of Reason doktrinen genom en renare tillämpning av 
Artikel 101(3) TFEU. 
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Preface 
This thesis is an original, unpublished, independent work by the author, 
Filip Ryman. 
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Abbreviations 
ECJ   European Court of Justice. 
 
EU European Union. 
 
RPM   Resale Price Maintenance . 
 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
USA United States of America. 
 
BER Block Exemption Regulation 
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Purpose 
This thesis will investigate the relationship between resale price 
maintenance (RPM) and consumer welfare. This is a topic of great interest 
for the author and quite relevant in the development in European 
competition law. During the last decades consumer welfare has taken over 
as the sole purpose of antitrust law and it is this development and the 
American view of the relationship between consumer welfare and RPM that 
has inspired this thesis.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to uncover to what extent consumer welfare is 
regarded as a part of European competition law as well as investigating the 
effects of RPM on this aspect in a critical investigation of the status of RPM 
as a hard-core restriction. The question the Author seeks to answer is if the 
effects of the practice on consumer welfare really are as detrimental as the 
Commission and the courts would suggest and if, through this, the 
presumption of illegality regarding RPM is valid. 
 
1.2 Method and Material 
The subject of this thesis will be approached using a combination of 
dogmatic, comparative and economic methodology. Throughout the thesis, 
the author will look into the framework governing resale price maintenance 
as a whole in the European Union as well as a comparison with the US 
approach.  
 
As case law is an integral part of the analysis of both the status of consumer 
welfare and the rules governing RPM, several cases regarding each topic 
will be referred to. 
 
The main part of the thesis will be the economic analysis of RPM. 
Therefore, doctrine has become the largest source of reference in this thesis 
mainly because the economics needed to analyse the effects of RPM is not 
to be found in either case law, treaties or other official documents of the EU. 
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1.3 Delimitations 
This thesis will cover consumer welfare in the competition law and antitrust 
law. The focus will then be the interplay between consumer welfare and 
RPM. There are more aspects of competition law, such as the protection of 
the internal market, which will not be dealt with. RPM is seen as a 
restriction of competition but the focus lies on the cartelization and price 
increase that are deemed to affect consumer welfare and competition as a 
process more than creating fragmentation in the market. The only issue of 
fragmentation that RPM creates is entry barriers for competitors which will 
be discussed in the economic theories. 
 
There is a multitude of economists, theorizing regarding the effects of RPM. 
In this thesis, only a few of the most prominent names will be represented. 
The theories and their authors are regarded to be the dominating ones in this 
field of research. Furthermore, only one anticompetitive theory has been 
chosen. The purpose of this thesis is not to fully investigate the effects of 
RPM, but to cast a light on the procompetitive side of the practice as a 
critique of the presumption that RPM generally has a negative effect on 
competition. 
 
1.4 Outline 
Chapter two of this thesis will begin by examining the framework governing 
RPM in the European Union combined with a shorter account on the US 
approach to the practice. Here we will see the presumption of illegality of 
RPM which will be follow us through the rest of the thesis. 
 
Chapter three continues to look into antitrust and competition law to discern 
what the purpose of competition and antitrust law is. Here we will see the 
place of consumer welfare in the two, followed by a chapter defining 
consumer welfare.  
 
In chapter four, which is the focus of the thesis, we look into the economics 
of RPM. How it affects the market and the actors in it with a focus on 
consumer welfare leading up the conclusion regarding the questions that 
was put forth in the purpose. 
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2 Resale Price Maintenance 
RPM is on the surface a simple and straightforward tool. A vertical restraint 
utilized by manufacturers and distributors to control the price of a product in 
the next level in the downstream market. A manufacturer can include in an 
agreement that a certain product must be sold at a certain price, not above a 
certain price, or lastly, that the product may not be sold under a certain 
price. Maximum resale price maintenance is not subject to this thesis since it 
is not included as a hard-core restriction in the Block Exemption Regulation 
and does generally not raise an issue in the European  market unless it can 
be deemed to set a fixed price. This goes for recommended prices as well as 
it does not create a fixed price, at least in theory.  
 
RPM has a long history of being seen as anti-competitive. In the USA there 
has been a per se illegality regarding RPM for almost a hundred years 
through the Sherman Act. However, the last decades there has been a 
change in the attitude towards RPM, starting with prominent economists 
arguing that the per se illegality was without grounds. This development 
started in the 60s, with the Chicago School as the vanguard for this crusade. 
It has been an ongoing development which culminated in the removal of the 
per se illegality in Leegin 2007, where the Supreme Court substituted it with 
the Rule of Reason. 
 
In the European Union there has been a similar development. This however 
has not lead to a similar result as will be shown below. RPM, as a vertical 
restraint has always been seen as anticompetitive and even now after the 
development in the USA and a similar loosening of the snare around vertical 
restraint in the EU there is a quite harsh presumption of illegality. 
 
 
2.1 The background of Vertical restraints 
in the EU Until today 
 
Vertical restraints are provisions in an agreement, between two parties in a 
vertical relationship that aims to limit competition.  Vertical restrictions 
have always been treated with suspicion and have been seen as limiting 
competition in the European as well as the market in the USA. In the USA 
there was a per se illegality connected with nearly all kinds of vertical 
restraints under the Sherman Act and it was not until the case of Leegin that 
the attitude towards vertical restraints started to shift for real.
1
  
 
                                                 
1
 Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007); Continental TV v. 
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1978) 
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In the EU there has always been an interest in vertical restraints and the 
reason is quite simple. One main objective of the EU is the creation of a 
single market and this is where vertical restraints can become a hindrance by 
partitioning the market and affecting intra-brand as well as interbrand 
competition.  
 
In 1966 the EU took its first decisive steps towards creating a framework 
regarding vertical restraints through the Consten Grundig case where the 
ECJ firmly established Article 85 (which now is article 101) was applicable 
to this kind of restraints. This was the start of was would become a quite 
extensive framework directed towards dealing with anticompetitive 
agreements such as these. In the EU, the Commission has been most 
prominent when it comes to loosening the snare around vertical restraints. 
As early as in the 1980s, the Commission started working on a block 
exemption regulation, which, as the name suggests, exempted some vertical 
restraints in certain situations. This was not the giant leap that the USA had 
taken with Leegin, which completely removed the per se illegality and 
replaced it with a Rule of Reason approach, but it was a step towards a more 
nuanced approach.  
 
The development continued in 1997 with the Green Paper on Vertical 
Restraints. This was a more in depth look into vertical restraints and the 
effects they had on the market, and laid out an early guideline to dealing 
with them.  The Green Paper however was lacking in several regards. The 
approach to vertical restraints was quite static. It was a form based 
assessment which lacked a more dynamic analysis of the situation. 
Furthermore it did not take into regard the market share and lacked a more 
economic perspective in the procedure. However, it was another step in the 
general direction of a more open mind regarding vertical restraints. The 
review that was the Green Paper resulted in several changes to competition 
law on an EU level. It led to a renewed framework with the 1999 Block 
Exemption Regulation and the guidelines a year later. It also led to more 
specialised BER as the motor vehicle in 2002 and the technology transfer 
BER in 2004. The general BER and the Commission guidelines were 
revised and the new version came out in 2011, these will be dealt with more 
in depth below. 
 
 
2.2 Current Legal Status 
 
As seen above, vertical restriction has always been treated with utmost care, 
almost with fear. Today, vertical restraints and RPM falls within the 
prohibition of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) with virtually no scope for meeting the strict 
conditions for exemption under Article 101(3). In 2011 there was a change 
with the new guidelines from the commission which loosened the snare 
around RPM, but not by much.  
9 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Article 101 
As a vertical restraint, RPM falls under Article 101 in the TFEU which has 
the purpose of controlling agreements and undertakings that might have 
adverse effects on competition. The first part of the Article, 101(1), reads: 
“1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in 
particular those which: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions;  
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment;  
(c) share markets or sources of supply;  
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.”2  
 
2.2.1.1 The test 
To establish a vertical restriction, it must be analyzed under Article 101 this 
analysis involves four steps. 
 
 It should apply to bilateral or multilateral conducts (agreements, 
concerted practices) which do not include agency agreements.
3
 
This jurisdictional point is a bit broader than it might seem at first glance. If 
an agreement falls under 101(1) a party cannot escape the scope of EU law 
even if its own contribution to the competition distorting parts of the 
agreement is insignificant. 
                                                 
2
 TFEU, Article 101. 
3
 Guidelines, paragraphs 24-30 
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 It must have appreciable effects on competition and trade between 
Member States.
4
 
 
 There have to be a restriction either in a) object, or b) effect.5 
 
Regarding the effect this area is a bit trickier than it might seem at first. 
Rather than an agreement having adverse effects on competition, it is 
enough with the notion that it could have these effects. For instance, RPM 
as part of the hard core restriction is seen as something that would make an 
agreement capable of distorting competition “by its very nature”. 
 
 In the case that a restriction exists under Article 101(1), Article 
101(3) can apply and then a balancing test of effects must be used.6 
This efficiency defense consists of four major points: efficiency 
gains; fair share for consumers; indispensability of the restrictions 
and no elimination of competition
7
. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Defense Under 101(3) 
Especially the efficiency gain has been subject to investigation. The 
Commission and courts has elaborated on this part quite a bit. The purpose 
is for the parties to establish that even though there is a restriction to 
competition, this fact is outweighed by gains in efficiency. This could be 
cost reductions, quality improvement, or other improvements to the products 
given that there is a causal link between the economic activity stemming 
from the restrictive agreement and these improvements
8
.  The burden of 
proof of the defendants is quite heavy regarding the efficiency gains. The  
defendants must show that the efficiency gains are linked to the specific 
agreement that are restricting competition, the nature  of these efficiencies, 
the likelihood of them and the specific time and place that these efficiencies 
would manifest themselves.
9
 
 
The definition of these efficiencies has been further developed during the 
years through case law. The most evident case is the case of 
GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission
10
. In this case the defendant 
(Glaxo) had an agreement that contained vertical restrictions in the form of 
territorial restrictions. The Commission was of the opinion that the 
agreement fell under article 101 because of this restraint, however, Glaxo 
made their defense under article 101(3). The arguments that Glaxo put forth 
                                                 
4
 Bayer appeal, paragraphs 47 and 174 
5
 Regulation, Articles 4-5 
6
 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline, paragraph 248 and 294; Guidelines, paragraph 122. 
7
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26114_en.htm 
8
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Para 45, 69-72 
9
 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Para 51-59 
10
 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission, 
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was that these restraints were necessary since the interbrand competition on 
the market for pharmaceuticals is driven by innovation in contrary to other 
markets that is normally driven by price. These restrictions would increase 
upstream competition and lead to additional profit which would be put into 
research and development due to the strong pressure to innovate. In this case 
the General court and the ECJ supported Glaxo in their claims. The General 
Court even stated that Glaxo’s defense was supported by Commission 
documents.
11
  The ECJ made one strong statement that the Commission had 
failed to take the unique structure of the pharmaceutical market into 
account. 
 
The Commissions definition of efficiency seems to be limited to economic 
factors, however supported by case law. There has been some debate 
regarding if this narrow view of efficiency gain should be expanded to a 
better fit with other public interests and EU policy. The Commission itself 
states in the Guidelines that other goals pursued by treaty provisions can be 
included in the process under Article 101(3).
12
 The Commissions reliance 
on the ruling in Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette SA v. Commission
13
, seems 
to signal that these other considerations are only to be used as a supplement 
to the economic analysis.
14
 In practice however, this seems to be less 
prominent and quite inconsistent while looking at the case law.  
 
In Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure and Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Limited
15
 where broadcasters tried to protect their interests through 
limiting the competition by territorial restrictions and use restrictions the 
broadcasters argued that it was in the public’s interest through the protection 
of copyright and increasing attendance in the stadium during football 
matches. Here the Court of Justice dismissed these arguments and their 
defense under 101(3) but did however not state that these arguments were 
not relevant.
16
 
 
This attitude can also be found in the Commissions reasoning. As an 
example one can look at the older case of Ford/volkswagen
17
. In this case 
Ford and Volkswagen were doing a joint venture in Portugal, building a 
factory. This agreement was seen as falling within the scope of Article 101 
(then 85(1)) but was exempted under the clause that was then 85(3). It was 
exempted under the economic analysis but what is important here is to note 
that the Commission stated the fact that this venture would have a 
significant effect on the labour market, by directly and indirectly creating 
around 15 000 jobs was to be taken into account. The Commission clearly 
stated that these factors would not on their own justified an exemption
18
 but 
one can sense a degree of importance placed on them. 
                                                 
11 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission, Para 233-307 
12
 EU Competition Law: Text, Cases And Materials, Alison Jones, supra note 278 
13
 Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette v Commission 
14
 EU Competition Law: Text, Cases And Materials, Alison Jones, supra note 279 
15
 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 
16
 Cases 403 and 429/08 
17
 Case IV/33.814 (93/49 EEC) 
18
 Case IV/33.814 (93/49 EEC), Para 36 
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Despite the focus on the efficiency aspect, it has been established both by 
the Commission and the ECJ that these points of defense are cumulative.
19, 
20
 
 
The second condition to be fulfilled so that a restriction may be exempted 
under 101(3) is that the consumers must be the recipients of a fair share of 
the efficiencies that the restriction creates.
21
 This is where one can start to 
see explicit references to consumer welfare. This is a concept that might 
seem clear and defined at first glance, but is one that we will go into more 
thoroughly below. This criterion can be said to be more depending on one of 
the other than the rest. This is because the Guidelines indicate that this 
criterion is to be investigated after the indispensability has been established 
since the fair share for consumers becomes superfluous if there is another, 
less restrictive way to create the efficiency gains in question.
22
 To explain 
this criterion further one must first establish what is meant by “consumer” 
and fair share. By consumer it is not limited to final consumers but this 
word contains all consumers in regard to the agreement. This is quite a 
broad definition and includes almost anyone that will purchase a product or 
service without regards to it being on whole sale or end user level.
23
 
However, the consumer definition does not include anything on an 
individual level, rather it takes into regard the groups of consumers in the 
relevant market. 
 
One question that has been under investigation regarding to this is how the 
placement of adverse and positive effects can be. Here there are some 
differences between the Guidelines and the case law. The Guidelines states 
that the positive effects must affect the consumers in the same market as the 
adverse effects do. In contrary to this, case law has shown a much broader 
view on how to weigh the effects, not limiting the analysis to the same 
market and even including future effects. This much broader approach 
seems to be a better fit also when comparing to the similar broad approach 
adopted under Article 102.
24
 
 
The concept of fair share is also one that seems to need some clarification. 
The Commission defines it in the Guidelines as follows: 
 
“The concept of "fair share" implies that the pass-
on of benefits must at least compensate consumers 
for any actual or likely negative impact caused to 
them by the restriction of competition found under 
Article 81(1). In line with the overall objective of 
Article 81 to prevent anti-competitive agreements, 
                                                 
19
 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifaxv. Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios, , ¶ 65. 
20
 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Para 123. 
21
 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Para 126. 
22
 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Para 126. 
23
 EU Competition Law: Text, Cases And Materials, Alison Jones, p 259 
24
 EU Competition Law: Text, Cases And Materials, Alison Jones, p 259 
13 
 
the net effect of the agreement must at least be 
neutral from the point of view of those consumers 
directly or likely affected by the agreement(80). If 
such consumers are worse off following the 
agreement, the second condition of Article 81(3) is 
not fulfilled. The positive effects of an agreement 
must be balanced against and compensate for its 
negative effects on consumers(81). When that is 
the case consumers are not harmed by the 
agreement. Moreover, society as a whole benefits 
where the efficiencies lead either to fewer 
resources being used to produce the output 
consumed or to the production of more valuable 
products and thus to a more efficient allocation of 
resources.”25 
 
We can see here that it is not necessary for consumers to gain positive 
effects from each efficiency gain that the restriction creates but more in line 
with the broader approach mentioned above. 
 
The third condition is the indispensability of the restriction. Basically it is 
the indispensability of the restriction to achieve the efficiency gains in 
question.
26
 Here, there is yet another test to affirm this indispensability. 
First, one is to look at the restrictive agreement itself so see if it is 
reasonably necessary to create the efficiency gain and to follow this up, one 
looks at the separate restrictions that the agreement creates in competition to 
see if these also can be deemed necessary to achieve the efficiency gains.
27
 
This means that a restriction cannot be deemed to be indispensable if it can 
be achieved by other means. 
 
Hardcore restrictions and restrictions that can be deemed as restriction in 
object have a presumption of being not indispensable in the Commissions 
eyes and among these we can find RPM.
28
 
 
The last condition is one that will later lead us into the earlier mentioned 
definition of consumer welfare. It is the criteria that the agreement must not 
allow the parties the possibility of eliminating competition
29
. This can also 
be seen as the protection of the competitive process, or, competition itself, 
as the Commission states in the Guidelines for Article 101(3):  
 
“ Ultimately the protection of rivalry and the 
competitive process is given priority over 
                                                 
25
 Commission Guidelines on Article 101(3). Para 85. 
26
 European Law, T P Kennedy, 6.7.3, p 171 
27
 European Law, T P Kennedy, 6.7.3, p 172 
28
 EU Competition Law: Text, Cases And Materials, Alison Jones, p 262 
29
 EU Competition Law: Text, Cases And Materials, Alison Jones, p 262 
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potentially pro-competitive efficiency gains which 
could result from restrictive agreements”.30 
 
This is not all that governs the area of vertical restrictions. There 
are also the block exemptions which will be explained below. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Block Exemptions 
The block exemptions (BER) are what the name entails, exemptions, and to 
be more specific, exemptions to Article 101. There are several BERs govern 
specific areas of the market such as the Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption and Regulation the Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation as well 
as more general BERs.  
 
The BERs function is to create an exemption in which Article 101(1) does 
not apply. The BERs has direct applicability and can therefore be applied on 
a national level. There is a difference however in the applicability of the 
BERs regarding technology transfer and vertical agreements. As a general 
rule, the BERs has a rigid scope that only creates applicability when the 
agreement falls precisely within it. The difference in the BERs regarding 
technology transfer and vertical agreements is that they among other BERs 
separate different provisions in hard-core restrictions that will create an 
inapplicability of the BER and provisions that even if not covered by the 
BER, does not create inapplicability for the rest of the agreement. 
 
The BERs are to be applied before an assessment under Article 101(1) is 
done and if exempted, the agreement is not hindered by this article. If not 
however, an assessment under 101(1) is to be conducted and if a restriction 
is deemed to exist, 101(3) comes into effect. However, the Commission 
states that it is unlikely for an agreement that contains a hard-core restriction 
to fulfil the requirements of 101(3). 
 
The content of a BER is often different depending on which you are looking 
at but they share similar cornerstones. The basis for most BERs is the 
market share and this is the case for the BER regarding vertical restraints, 
which can only apply when the market share of the undertaking is below 
30%. This is similar in the Technology Transfer Block Exemption and 
Regulation in which the market shares are 20% if the parties are competitors 
and 30% if that is not the case. 
 
Regarding the earlier mentioned hard-core restrictions, which RPM is a part 
of, these are also contained in many of the BERs. As stated, these are 
restriction that, if included in an agreement, creates an inapplicability of the 
BER to the agreement. This is shows the Commissions stance on this type 
                                                 
30
 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Para 105 
15 
 
of restrictions and the Guidelines also states that these restrictions are 
unlikely to pass the test of 101(3). 
 
This creates a presumption of illegality regarding RPM, which is, as the 
guidelines state, unlikely to be rebutted. In the US the approach is quite 
different following recent developments in case law which we will se in the 
following chapter, where they have removed the earlier per se illegality of 
RPM and created an even more effect based approach than the analysis 
under Article 101. 
 
 
2.2.4 A Change in the USA - Leegin Leather 
Products  
 
The per se illegality of vertical price restrictions was read into the Sherman 
act for many years but was formalized by the case Dr Miles in regards to 
RPM. However, this was over 100 years ago and through persons such as 
Bork and Posner who’s theories will be explained below, the attitude shifted 
towards these kinds of restraints over the years.
31
 This lead up to the change 
in 2007 with the case Leegin Leather products.  
 
In this case, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc
32
, a retailer 
to Leegin marked down Leegin’s priducts by 20%. Leegin took them to 
court claiming this to be against their pricing policy but was first denied all 
right to make a case of the procompetitive effects of RPM in the district 
court based on the per se illegality through the Dr Miles case. Leegin 
appealed causing the change from per se illegality to a Rule of Reason and 
an approach more focused on the economic analysis of each case. The 
works of scholars such as Robert Bork and Coase heavily influenced this 
path and had pressured the court for many years to make a change. This was 
followed by several judgments regarding vertical restrictions which lead to a 
solid foundation for the Rule of Reason in the US. This was seen as more in 
line with the purpose of antitrust law, which had moved to a consumer 
welfare standard opposed to the older view that it was to protect competitors 
and competition itself.  
 
This view is shared by many countries around the world such as Australia, 
who has consumer welfare as the paramount goal and even China who has 
consumer welfare as a partial goal of competition law. 
 
                                                 
31
 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
32
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2.3 An Effect Based Approach or an 
Effects Based Process? 
As seen above, the economic analysis has been given a place in competition 
law but it is not ajour with the modern economics. Even though the per se 
illegality of RPM does not exist in the EU, it remains a hard-core restriction. 
This comes with a presumption of illegality, which might be hard to rebut.  
 
The question regarding if there is a Rule of Reason in the case of restrictions 
under 101(3) is a complicated one. 101(3) opens up the possibility for a 
case-by-case analysis and defence of otherwise prohibited practices. The 
question is however, if this can be seen as an implementation of the Rule of 
Reason doctrine adapted in the US regarding vertical restrictions? This is a 
question that has been debated the last couple of years, with scholars 
advocating that the EU should move towards a more pure Rule of Reason.  
 
There is a legal difference between the approach in the US and the EU. The 
legal basis for the economic analysis is section 2 in the Sherman act. In the 
EU there is a multi-step process through article 101 to conduct any sort of 
economic analysis as seen above. Even though 101(3) contains the elements 
of the Rule of Reason doctrine it is still a more rigid approach creating more 
legal certainty while sacrificing the possibility of a dynamic analysis. ¨ 
 
Alexander Italianer Director-General for Competition in the European 
Commission discussed this subject and said regarding Article 101 that: 
 
“…under Article 101(1), no matter whether the restraint is by object or by 
effect, the contextual analysis never goes as far as balancing the anti- and 
pro-competitive effects. It only aims at gauging the negative consequences 
of the restraint for the process of competition, for which the Commission or 
plaintiff carries the burden of proof. In other words, the analysis under 
Article 101(1) deals exclusively with identifying competitive harm.”33 
 
So, this is one of the steps in the process which leads to the economic 
analysis in 101(3). However, regarding price restrictions he stated that: 
 
“It is true that severe restrictions of competition – such as price fixing or 
limiting, controlling and sharing markets – are unlikely to meet the 
conditions for exemption under Article 101(3) as they rarely enhance 
efficiencies or benefit consumers and are rarely indispensable”34 
 
                                                 
33
Alexander Italianer Director-General for Competition in the European Commission, 40th 
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Competition Law 
Institute New York, 2013 
34
 Alexander Italianer Director-General for Competition in the European Commission, 40th 
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Competition Law 
Institute New York, 2013 
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This shows that even though there is an economic evaluation conducted 
case-by-case, there is still a quite harsh presumption of illegality regarding a 
practice such as RPM. 
 
 
2.3.1 A European Rule of Reason 
 
Discussions regarding an adoption of the Rule of Reason doctrine from the 
US has been discussed in Commission level as well in the Courts but 
dismissed with various arguments. The Rule of Reason doctrine originates 
from US case law, specifically the Standard Oil case.
35
 The basis for the 
Rule of Reason is here stated to be that the Sherman Act is supposed to 
promote one of the most fundamental parts of the law governing a market, 
the right to conclude a contract and not hinder it. The Rule of Reason is a 
case-by-case method, analysing the nature of the agreement and all 
surrounding circumstances. It is similar to the approach under 101(3) but it 
is less bound by procedural requirements and the analysis is open to take 
into regard any arguments for and against the case in question.  
 
The Commission brought up the topic in their White Paper
36
. In this they 
stated that an adoption of the Rule of Reason was unnecessary since article 
101(3) contains all the elements of this doctrine already.
37
 While it might be 
true that 101(3) do contain all the elements of a Rule of Reason, its effects 
based analysis is bound by different constraints than the US doctrine. While 
in the Rule of Reason doctrine, the burden of proof is on the one claiming a 
restriction of competition, under 101(3) the presumption of illegality turns 
this around. Here the defendant is seen as guilty until proven otherwise 
when dealing with RPM, quite a twisted version of the Rule of Reason. 
 
Is there a reason for this system where one must prove the innocence of a 
practice, and what is the fear of RPM based upon? To examine this RPM we 
must first look into what the EU wants to achieve by this - what they are 
trying to protect from the alleged harm that comes with the practicing of 
RPM. 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Standard Oil Co. v. United States,  221 U.S 
36
 Commission, White paper on modernization of the rules implementing articles 85 and 85 
of the EC-Treaty, 1999 
37
 Commission, ‘White paper on modernization of the rules implementing articles 85 and 
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3 The Purpose of Competition 
and Antitrust Law 
When looking at competition law it can be hard to distinguish a clear goal in 
the law as well as competition policy. There are differences regarding the 
goal between different markets and there are even different interpretations 
of these goals.  A good example of this is the debate in the US regarding 
their antitrust law. It started back in the 60s with the book “The Antitrust 
Paradox” by Judge Bork. In this article, he argued that the ultimate goal of 
antitrust law
38
 was to promote efficiency, protect consumers and 
competition rather than creating protection for the other actors on the 
market.  He has been criticized by e.g Brietzke who has called Borks view 
to narrow and even accused him of using the term consumer welfare as a 
“staking horse” for corporate welfare.39   
 
First we must establish a difference between the European competition law 
and the US antitrust law. Antitrust law was created as a tool to deal with so 
called “trusts”, a sort of cartel.40 The European competition law originates in 
the very core of the European Union, the goal to create and maintain the 
internal market.
41
 However, regarding article 101, competition law and 
antitrust law shares a common approach in that both base the analysis on an 
economic framework. Article 101 distinguishes itself from e.g. 102 in this 
regard. One can see through the many documents such as the guidelines for 
article 101, that the focus is more on the economic aspects.
42
 It is in the light 
of this similarity in antitrust law and competition law that a comparison will 
be made and which creates the possibility of the later economic analysis of 
RPM.  
 
In the EU as well as in the US, there has not been a quite as thorough debate 
regarding the specific goals of competition law and as many as five different 
definitions have been applied to competition.
43
First, there is the view that 
competition means “the absence of restraints”. This does not mean just the 
absence of restraints as in the absence of rules on a national and 
supranational level but would require the abolition of all rules, even between 
parties in which commercial contracts would be included. This is a view that 
                                                 
38
 This was aimed solely at the American market at the time since it was regarding the 
Sherman Act but spoke of the purpose of competition law in general. 
39
 Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 7, Robert Bork, The 
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself Paul H. Brietzke, p. 418 
40
 For a more detailed explanation, se footnote 84. 
41
 Robert O'Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, p 
62 
42
 Robert O'Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, p 
68 
43 Eugene Buttigieg, Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest : a 
Comparative Analysis, p3 
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is not very wide spread and has little ground in the USA as well as the EU 
but has seen the light of day in Chicago Board of Trade
44
, in which one 
judge used this meaning. The Commission has also been seen using this 
definition under heavy critique.
45
 
 
Secondly, there is the view as competition as a state of perfect competition. 
This definition, put forth by Stigler has been criticized by Bork, stating that 
even if it’s a great economic model, it can never be used as a foundation for 
policy making. The basis is that the elasticity of supply that any buyer can 
encounter is limitless. Stigler has put forth four criteria for this to exist: 
perfect knowledge, product homogeneity, large numbers and divisibility of 
output.
46
  
 
The third definition is one that competition needs a fragmented market. This 
means that the basis and purpose of competition is that all actors on the 
market is locally owned. This view was earlier a part of the American 
position but was attacked since it lead to a near abolition of all mergers in 
the same market.  
 
The fourth definition is one that many would say that its being used in the 
EU. It is the thought that competition is a process in which the parties 
should enjoy freedom and protection without any hindering regulation, 
especially the medium and smaller competitors; this is known as the 
ordoliberal view.  
 
At last, we have the definition that will be the basis of the rest of this thesis; 
competition as a process that is to be utilized to maximize consumer 
welfare. By many considered to be the “best” definition of competition, this 
definition was put forth by the Chicago School and judge Robert Bork and 
will be explained in chapter 3.2.1. 
 
 
3.1 The EU Goals of Competition Law 
The EU competition law framework does not strive towards one single goal. 
It is a multi-goal framework.  As the Competition Commissioner Van Miert 
stated in 1993: 
 
“The aims of the European Community’s 
competition policy are economic, political and 
social. The policy is concerned not only with 
promoting efficient production but also achieving 
the aims of the European treaties: establishing a 
                                                 
44
 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States 246 US 231 
45
 Eugene Buttigieg, Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest : a 
Comparative Analysis,  , p 3 
46
 Eugene Buttigieg, Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest : a 
Comparative Analysis,  , p 4 
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common market, approximating economic policies, 
promoting harmonious growth, raising living 
standards, bringing Member states closer together 
etc. To this must be added the need to safeguard a 
pluralistic democracy, which could not survive a 
strong concentration of economic power”47 
 
In this Chapter, a movement will be shown, in line with the development of 
antitrust in the USA in the thinking regarding Community competition law. 
This shift is subtle but still clear if one were to look a bit closer.  
 
The establishing of a common market has long been considered the main 
goal of community competition law as seen in the Consten Grundig
48
 case 
where the Court states that the prevention of market segregation is of utmost 
importance in the community. However, here we indirectly see a connection 
to consumer welfare in the line of thinking in this case since a part of this 
objective is to break down the barriers of choice for the consumer.
49
 It is this 
goal of competition law that the author wishes to highlight here. Many have 
acknowledged the shift towards a consumer welfare standard in the EU. 
Some even stating that a total shift already has occurred as Devlin and 
Jacobs in “Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics”.50 This 
however cannot be said to be the case.  
 
Before diving deeper into the consumer welfare aspect of competition law, 
the author wishes to highlight that one of the primary goals of European 
competition law has been and is, the protection of the internal market. The 
prevention of fragmentation has always been one of the key components of 
the European Union and will probably continue to be. This area of 
competition law will not be dealt with in any depth, since the purpose of this 
thesis is to examine the consumer welfare aspect of competition law.  
 
However, regarding the place of consumer welfare within the competition 
law and policy of the European union, there has been an increasing focus on 
the consumer when dealing with competition law throughout the years even 
if it has not been thoroughly discussed in case law. In the earlier years of the 
EU, the focus has been mainly on efficient competition, in which the actors 
on the market is protected and regulated between themselves
51
. Earlier than 
this, it was stated in Consten & Grundig that the goal of EU competition law 
was the integration of the internal market
52
. The Commission has stated that 
consumer welfare is the goal of EU competition law as see in the guidelines 
for article 81(3) and later 101(3)
53
. However, it was not until 2006 in 
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 European Commission, XV Annual Report on Competition Policy 1985 (1986). 
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GlaxoSmithKline
54
 that the General court confirmed what the commission 
has already had stated, that consumer welfare is the goal of EU competition 
law. In their judgement, they stated that: 
  
“In effect, the objective assigned to that provision 
is to prevent undertakings, by restricting 
competition between themselves or with third par-
ties, from reducing the welfare of the final 
consumer of the products in question.”55 
 
This judgment was later appealed to the Court of Justice, which corrected 
the general by stating that consumer welfare was only one part of a larger 
analysis and that a large part of the goal of EU competition law was 
competition itself and the structure of the market.
56
 
 
The Commission however, has shown the most progress towards creating  a 
consumer welfare standard. It has shown itself very open to apply policies 
of the EU that does not have a direct legal correlation cases before them. A 
good example of this is the cases of Metro (no 1) and the case of 
Ford/Volkswagen where employment policy where used as a strong 
argument in their decision. Furthermore, they did the same regarding the 
Uniform Eurocheques decision where they took into regard, Community 
monetary policy in their argument.
57
 This clearly shows that the 
Commission regards Community policies as having an influence over the 
process under article 101(3) and this can be said of the consumer protection 
policy as well. The Commission has earlier also clearly stated their belief 
that consumer welfare should practically be the sole goal of competition 
policy and law, ridding the assessment of non-efficiency goals. This could 
be seen when they published the White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules 
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty as well as the guidelines 
to Article 83(1).
58
 
 
These statements was however not upheld by the courts, creating somewhat 
of a conflict on the purpose of competition law. It was only in 
GlaxoSmithKline that the ECJ acknowledged the existence of consumer 
welfare as a part of the assessment but dismissed the Commissions approach 
that it was the sole goal of EU competition law. 
 
This would be the end of it if it were not for two facts. First the 
Commission’s view is that consumer welfare is to be considered the only 
                                                                                                                            
functioning of the European Union to categories of research and development 
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54
 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European 
Communities. 
55 case t-168/01 glaxosmithkline v. commission par. 10 
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goal of competition law, or at least a dominant part of it paying little 
attention to the non-efficiency arguments. Secondly, it is up to the 
Commission to investigate a conduct under article 101 and also decide 
whether or not it falls under the scope and if so, any further assessment if 
conducted by the Commission. Now, the Commission is not likely to oppose 
the court’s interpretation of the treaties on a consistent basis, but the 
discussion leading up to a vote on a decision is deemed confidential.
59
 It 
could very well be the case that the Commissioners would let their view of 
competition law influence their decision as has already been seen in de 
Havilland.
60
 Monti stated that during this case commissioners wanted to 
approve a merger based on the non-efficiency arguments that the courts 
have established as the primary base. However the merger was prohibited 
since a commissioner named Leon Brittand argued heavily for the consumer 
welfare aspect.  
 
Even today, the Director-General for Competition in the European 
Commission, Alexander Italianer stated that: 
 
“In its quest to protect rivalry among firms and so the competitive process 
to promote consumer welfare, the Court takes a broad approach when it 
comes to concerted restraints on the competitive autonomy of firms that are 
liable to impede the competitive outcome”.61 
 
This shows that even if not visible at first, EUs shift towards a consumer 
welfare standard has been ongoing. It is not the definite path taken by our 
US counterparts but the place of consumer welfare is unsure yet strong, at 
least at a practical level. This leads us to the question, how to define 
consumer welfare? 
 
 
3.2  The Consumer Welfare Standard 
Consumer welfare is often regarded as an integral part of a competition law 
and policy around the world, but the term is often used wrong or 
misinterpreted.
62
 To clearly establish the role of consumer welfare in the 
European competition law, a solid definition of the EU approach has to be 
made. 
 
There are two major interpretations of the concept of consumer welfare, and 
both have a different focus. However, one must first differentiate the 
consumer welfare standard from the total welfare standard. The latter will 
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not be dealt with in detail in this chapter since this standard moves the focus 
of competition law and policy to strive towards economic efficiency by 
prioritizing the gains for society as a whole rather than the consumer. This 
approach, mostly supported by the Chicago school, was discussed above.  
 
The two different interpretations of consumer welfare are quite similar in all 
but one aspect, one focuses on the long term and one on the short term. An 
approach based on short term goals entails a focus on price reductions and 
other aspects that are directly measurable while the long term approach 
focuses more on increasing innovation and efficiency gains. The latter of 
these could be said to resemblance the total welfare standard more than a 
version of the consumer welfare standard, however, the simple difference is 
that in the long-term consumer welfare standard, the focus is still the 
consumer and how these innovations and efficiency gains can benefit him or 
her in contrast to the total welfare standard in which many more factors are 
in play to determine the welfare level. 
 
The term consumer welfare has its origin in the US. It was put forth by Bork 
in the previously mentioned “The Antitrust Paradox” as the paramount goal 
of antitrust law. His consumer welfare theory has later dominated the 
interpretation of the Sherman act and to establish a definition of consumer 
welfare, one must look into his work. 
 
 
3.2.1 Consumer Welfare Theory 
Robert Bork could be considered the main advocate for consumer welfare as 
the goal of competition and was also the one who started the main debate 
regarding the topic in the US in the 60s with a number of articles and could 
be said to have finished it with his book “the Antitrust Paradox”. His take on 
consumer welfare’s place in antitrust law created a paradigm shift in the 
purpose of antitrust in the US.
63
 The reason for the impact of Bork’s “The 
Antitrust Paradox” in contrast to Posner and other who had argued for a 
more economic analysis of law is probably since he lays down simple, yet 
eloquent rules on how to improve the approach in antitrust law as well as 
forming a single goal of this legislation, even if this goal contains more than 
only the words suggests as will be shown below. Bork argued that the law 
regarding vertical restraints should move from a per se illegality to an more 
nuanced approach as was created with Leegin. He stated that: 
 
“...The whole task of antitrust can be summed up 
as the effort to improve allocative efficiency 
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly 
as to produce no gain or a net loss in consumer 
welfare”64 
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Borks theory was one of the Chicago School, advocating for an efficient 
market. The theory of the efficient market is not something that is easily 
applied to the European market since this is based on a less regulated 
American market, and even there it is a theory and not a practice. However, 
despite its roots in the Chicago School the consumer welfare theory does not 
incorporate the efficient market hypothesis but it is rather the other way 
around.  
 
In economics, consumer welfare is equal to the well-being of the buyer. 
However, it is a concept that one who is a novice in the field of economics 
easily might mistake for another well-known economic term. One 
traditional way of looking at consumer welfare namely is that it is the same 
as consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is calculated through the 
Marshallian analysis of partial equilibrium. This analysis, named after the 
economist Alfred Marshall, defines consumer surplus and welfare as the 
difference between the price a consumer is willing to pay for a product and 
the actual price that they are paying.
65
 This can be illustrated by the figure 
below.
 66
 
 
 
Here we can see the producer surplus represented as well. This is the 
difference in production cost and the price that the manufacturer sells the 
product for. This combined with the surplus for the consumer can be 
labelled as a total surplus. The notion that consumer welfare is equal to 
consumer surplus is flawed. This is because the benefit that the consumer  
receives in the calculation of consumer surplus is only based on the 
consumers own notion of what is beneficial to him or her.  The economist 
Gregory Mankiw gives a good example of the difference between consumer 
welfare and surplus by mentioning heroin addicts. He means that it is in the 
addicts interest to procure heroin and his addiction creates a demand that, by 
looking at the figure above, would push the demand curve upwards. The 
addict is willing to pay a higher price because his demand of heroin is so 
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great. However, from an outside perspective and from the view of society, 
this is not contributing to the welfare of the consumer.
67
 
 
This shows the difference between the two concepts. Bork has received 
critique for his “misconception” of term consumer welfare68, since in 
economics; the term consumer welfare has been equal to the concept of 
consumer surplus. Economists argue that Borks view of consumer welfare 
rather is allocative efficiencies, competition and wealth maximization 
bundled up.
69
 This is where it, the authors view, becomes interesting. It is 
the Authors opinion that Bork did not misinterpret the concept of consumer 
surplus but his goal was to create an entirely new label. He himself explains 
the concept as follows:  
 
“Consumer welfare is the greatest when society’s economic resources are 
allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as 
technological constraints permit. Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely 
another term for the wealth of the nation…”70 
 
This has received critique since this would equal what in economics is 
known as social welfare and therefore many see this as confusion in Borks 
reasoning.
71
 The Author of this thesis however, does not. Social welfare and 
consumer welfare differs on one important aspect. Social welfare is in 
economics equal to the previously mentioned total surplus, an analysis 
excluding parts such as policy driven goals and the welfare of society as a 
whole. What Bork includes in his consumer welfare theory is policy and the 
needs for the society as a whole. This is a new concept and more suitable to 
apply in such a policy driven area such as antitrust law as well as European 
competition law.  
 
Having established the place of consumer welfare in competition law and 
what this concept entails, this leads us to the next part of this thesis, the 
interplay between consumer welfare and RPM.  Now that it has been shown 
above that consumer welfare is an integral part of competition law, we now 
need to look into the economics of RPM and how this interacts with this 
area of law.  
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4 The Economic Theories 
Regarding Resale Price 
Maintenance 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that consumer welfare has a strong 
presence in European competition law, at least at a practical level. When 
dealing with a restraint such as RPM, one must have in mind that it is an 
economic tool, used on a market with effects measurable only through 
economic analysis. The way of thought to strike a balance between 
restrictive effects and efficiency benefits is not a too old one. Looking at the 
US, which has been in the forefront of the development of competition law, 
it was not until the 1970s through the Chicago School that the 
procompetitive sides were aired with a degree of seriousness. It was 
attributed to prominent figures like Richard Posner and Robert Bork who 
started to publish works, arguing for the pro-competitive side of these 
restrictions.
72
 These ideas were the start of a paradigm shift in the USA 
regarding antitrust creating a less interventionist and nuanced approach 
towards restrictions of competition.
73
 The USA has always been an 
inspiration to the European countries and the EU regarding these issues but 
it took the EU several decades to accept this line of thinking and implement 
it themselves to some extent. Even so, a European scholar must approach 
the American economic theories with care.
74
 
 
 
4.1 The Interplay Between Economics and 
Law 
The relationship between economics and law is a complicated one. If you 
were to ask an economist you would probably get the answer that 
economics bears precedent over law and that the law is only there to 
regulate. However, if you were to ask a lawyer, the answer would probably 
not give such a high status to economics in relation to law. Especially in a 
field such as competition law, where the very area that is to be regulated is 
one of economics and finance, the two areas becomes so intertwined, that 
the interdependency is, in the author’s view, already a fact.  
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The idea of an economic analysis of law began to take shape as a movement 
between 1958 and 1973. In 1958 the first number of the Journal of Law and 
Economics was published and the second date is when Posner published his 
book Economic Analysis of Law. Posner himself states that before the first 
date, the movement could not be said to exist, and after the second, its 
existence could not be denied.
75
 Today the approach is evident in the USA 
and in the EU and is considered by many to be the single most significant 
development in the field of law since legal realism.
76
 
 
One of the most prominent contributors in this field is Richard Posner 
Posner. He is more or less connected to the Chicago School, which is quite 
anticipated, considering his views on the matter. The Chicago School is the 
institute which has lead the development of the movement since the Journal 
of Law and Economics is published here and many of the most prominent 
scholars in the field is connected to the school such as Coase and Becker.  
 
The theory put forth by Posner, that a Judge will act as a lawmaker and try 
to form the law to attain specific goals in policy and welfare and this can 
only be done through a rigorous economic analysis which can foresee the 
effects of the law. Posner summarizes his idea as such: 
 
“As conceived in this book, economics is the 
science of rational choice in a world—our world—
in which resources are limited in relation to 
human wants. The task of economics, so defined, is 
to explore the implications of assuming that man is 
a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his 
satisfactions—what we shall call his “self-
interest.”77 
 
 
Through this, one understands Posners view as economics as a tool of 
understanding the needs in society and the foundation of law. In an 
economic market, only economics can be used to foresee the effects of a 
rule and is therefore needed to create the most efficient rules to achieve 
wealth maximization 
 
So to understand the effects and suitable approach to vertical restraints one 
must utilize an economic analysis. Posner also applies his approach to the 
price system with an example: 
 
“No milk czar decides how much milk is needed 
when and by whom and then obtains the necessary 
inputs, which include dairy farms and farmers, 
milk-supply plants, refrigerated milk trucks, 
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packaging equipment and materials, accounting 
and other support activities, and the scheduling 
and provision of delivery to retail outlets.” 
 
With this example Posner wishes to show the static nature of the 
market, that everything is coordinated from within and from 
outside through the price system. Posner regards the world as 
being in equilibrium and that the main concern for a society is to 
strive towards social wealth through all its institutions, including 
law.
78
 
 
 
4.1.1 The Criticism of the Economic Approach 
 
Posners ideas are supported by many but equally so challenged by others. 
The most prominent one is Nobel Laureate in economics, Friedrich Hayek. 
Hayek has criticized a fundamental part in Posners theory, that if one 
assumes that the judge in question has implemented wealth maximization as 
a goal and that this judge possesses the ability to conduct an adequate 
economic analysis of the law in question, how can he be sure that this 
actually will be an improvement in the law?
79
 
 
A Hayekian views society as a Darwinian views nature, what Hayek calls a 
“spontaneous order”. With “spontaneous”, Hayek means that it is a self-
regulating entity with no real design and markets are a good example of this. 
Thus, he believes that putting too much power to regulate this in an 
administrative entity would endanger liberty and the rule of law. Hayek 
argues for a more dynamic view of the market and that a “sole goal” is to 
disturb this self-regulating society.
80
   
 
In regards to European competition law, we have a market model more 
suited to the Posnerian view. The internal market, as seen above does not 
only consider social wealth maximization as the goal of competition law but 
this is an insignificant difference. The focus here lies in the view of the 
market as either dynamic and self-regulating, or something with equilibrium 
that should be regulated to strive towards a certain goal.  
 
With this need of economic analysis of law, especially in a field such as 
competition we now turn to the theories regarding RPM. 
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4.2 The Anticompetitive Side of RPM 
 
There is really no dispute regarding the fact that RPM has the possibility to 
limit competition. Regarding consumer welfare the main concerns are the 
creating of monopoly pricing and that the efficiency gains is not allocated to 
the consumer but rather the manufacturers and perhaps the retailer. There 
are different schools of thought and they all focus on different possible 
situations. There are theories regarding collusion on the retailer level as well 
as the manufacturing level. The key component in all of them is that they 
aim to show a decrease in welfare, even though the definition of this exact 
concept may differ a lot if one were to look into it more closely as seen 
above. 
 
To illustrate this side of RPM, the author has chosen to turn to the work 
done by Thibaud Vergé and Patrick Rey. The two authors have during the 
last decade published a number of articles and papers regarding the 
economy behind RPM. Their latest contribution, regarding the 
monopolizing effect of RPM was published in 2010 under the title, “Resale 
Price Maintenance and Interlocking Partnerships”. Due to its complex 
mathematical nature, a shorter summary will be presented below.  
 
4.3 Thibaud Vergé and Patrick Rey 
 
The industry-cartelization argument has been the main justification for 
earlier per se illegality of RPM in the US and is the main concern in the EU 
as well
81
. Vergé and Rey explain that this facilitating practice has been 
developed by scholars such as Telser and later by Jullien, and Rey himself. 
With Jullien, Rey concluded that: 
 
“by making retail prices less responsive to local shocks 
on retail cost or demand, RPM yields more uniform 
prices that facilitate tacit collusion – by making 
deviations easier to detect
82.” 
 
With Vergé, Rey examines the same practice but from another angle. The 
specific situation under examination is when multiple manufacturers 
collaborate with multiple retailers. In their article they state that when it 
comes to a retail monopoly, manufacturers can avoid interbrand competition 
by selling at cost and incorporate a fixed fee as exchange. This is based on 
the work of Bernheim and Whinston, and O’Brien and Shaffer,  and Vergé 
and Rey summarize it as follows:   
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“..since manufacturers internalize through fixed fees the 
impact of prices on the retailer’s profit, eliminating the 
upstream margin on one brand transforms a rival 
manufacturer into a residual claimant on the sales of 
both brands. As a result, the rival manufacturer has an 
incentive to maintain retail prices at the monopoly level, 
which it can achieve precisely by supplying at cost. 
Simple two-part tariffs therefore suffice to maintain 
monopoly prices and profits.”83 
 
When there are more than one retailer involved, the situation changes since 
the intra-brand competition has a clear effect on the retailer’s margins. This 
is where we start to approach the core of Verge’s and Rey’s article. The 
industry always wants to maximize their profit and there are two large 
incentives for the manufacturers to consider: if they want to maximize their 
sales in this situation, they want to keep low upstream margins to avoid 
interbrand competition or but also keep the wholesale price up to maximize 
profit.
84
  
 
Rey and Vergé shows that two-part tariffs no longer is sufficient to maintain 
monopoly prices but brings forth the new tool, two-part tariffs in 
combination with RPM. Through this, they show that manufacturers can 
give eachother incentives to keep retail prices high effectively eliminating 
both intra- and interbrand competition despite the fact that no multilateral 
agreement exists. They state that this mechanism has a unique effect that is 
unprecedented in other vertical restraints such as territorial restrictions. This 
is since restriction such as territorial ones may have adverse effects for the 
manufacturer due to retailors differentiation strategies. These specializations 
can make it undesirable for the manufacturer to exclude retailors on a 
territorial basis but this does not limit the positive effects of RPM which 
even with this in regard, would able manufacturers to eliminate intra-brand 
competition.
85
   
 
 
4.4 RPM in Regard to Consumer Welfare – 
a Positive Side? 
In contrast to the previous chapter, it must be said that despite the animosity 
often shown towards RPM, there are many who are advocating for its 
positive effects on competition, especially in regards to consumer welfare. 
Regardless how eloquent and solid a case Rey and Vergé makes against 
RPM, their theory still only shown a small part of the effects the utilization 
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of a tool such as RPM can have. There are an equal amount of theories 
regarding the positive aspects of RPM. 
 
 
4.4.1 Borks Argument 
The theory of welfare put forth by Bork, which is explained above, states 
that RPM has the possibility to be advantageous for competition since it can 
affect customer welfare positively. According to Bork, RPM can be used to 
increase welfare through increased services, innovations and other factors. 
This theory as well as the image theory are based on consumer interests and 
put this factor as the most important part in competition law. However, the 
theory presumes that producer interests and the interests of the consumer are 
the same, which has been criticized
86.
 He continues to claim that there is an 
increase in competition through an increase services due to RPM, which 
then causes consumer demand to surge and, therefore, he concludes that 
RPM is “highly pro-competitive and enhance[s] consumer welfare by 
stimulating inter-brand rivalry”.87 
 
Borks theory of welfare effects is based on an assumption that consumers 
make their choice also based on non-price aspects, for instance extra 
services – and with this he means that the more services a market entity can 
provide, the consumers will buy more or at least it will create an interest of 
buying the product – and that RPM is a good aid in to increase the 
availability of such aspects (services). Though, in reality, this does not 
motivate all potential buyers, many are still interested in such aspects as 
price and perhaps mainly this. Furthermore Bork states that consumer 
welfare is the only really important aspect to consider.  
 
Borks argument is based upon that put forth by Telser and this will be 
explained below in chapter 4.4.4. Borks part in this is that he decisively 
connects RPM and Telsers service theory with consumer welfare as he 
interprets it.  
 
 
4.4.2 Posners Argument 
Posner was one of the advocates for a removal of the per se illegality of 
resale price maintenance in the US, before the change with Leegin. It was 
Posners view that a presumption of legality was the right path regarding the 
practice.
88
 He counters the cartelization argument calling RPM an 
ambiguous sign of a cartel - what RPM shows is only that a manufacturer is 
seeking to further his own end by controlling the resale price. According to 
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Posner there is no empirical nor theoretical evidence that can declare RPM 
as generally anticompetitive as one could say the EU has done by labelling 
it as a hardcore restriction.
89
 
 
 
4.4.3 Marvels Argument 
 
Marvel argued for the procompetitive aspects of RPM during the 80s and 
90s before the overturned per se illegality in Leegin. His most notable work 
and most suitable for this thesis is The Welfare Effects of Resale Price 
Maintenance in the Journal of Law and Economics. In this article, he 
compares the effects of per se illegality with per se legality to see which 
would prove least detrimental to consumer welfare. Even if the case in the 
EU is not a choice between per se legality or illegality, Marvels analysis and 
statements regarding the positive effects of RPM are still valid when 
discussing the presumption of illegality in the EU.
90
 
 
Marvel concedes that RPM can facilitate collusion but in a vast majority of 
cases is a symptom rather than the cause. However, despite the fact that 
RPM can and has been used by monopolies and suspected monopolies, 
Marvel wishes to show us that the total effect on competition is positive, 
and that theorists such as Vergé and Rey are disproved by empirical 
evidence. 
 
Marvel begins with the classical procompetitive argument put forth by 
Telser in the 60s, the theory of service, which also was incorporated in 
Borks argumentation on a positive effect on consumer welfare. This theory 
will be presented below along with Telsers other arguments for the 
procompetitive effects of RPM. Telser gives some empirical examples on 
which Marvel continues as a starting point of his article, namely the trusts in 
the factor system.
91
 Through this Marvel wants to disprove the argument 
that resale price maintenance is used to induce retailer loyalty and through 
this create an entry barrier for new parties. Marvel presents a couple of 
examples of these trusts that used RPM and shows that no entry barriers 
were established. In all cases, a new company, even one taking up a very 
small part of the market, was able to penetrate the market successfully.
92
 
Marvel continues by stating that even if RPM is present and contributing to 
a cartel’s stability, that itself does not constitute a reason to treat the practice 
itself with hostility. Furthermore, in Marvels view, one that is shared by the 
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author, the presumption of illegality that exists in the EU with the possibility 
of rebuttal, is in practice very close to per se illegality due to the difficulties 
to prove such efficiency gains that are required. However, he also notes that 
it would prove equally difficult to have a reversed burden of proof, and this 
is because the existence of such anticompetitive effects that would be 
needed to be shown, is very rare.
 93
 
 
 
4.4.4 Telsers Argument 
Telser was one of the Chicago School economists that during the 60s and 
70s and is the creator of the “theory of services”. Telser published in 1960 
the article “ Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?” in the Journal of 
Law and economics. In his article, Telser investigated resale price 
maintenance and the motivation for a manufacturer to utilize this tool. 
Telser begins by stating that the issue of RPM is one that has puzzled 
economists for quite some time. Why would a manufacturer want to 
eliminate price competition from the equation? Do not the manufacturers 
have most to gain through a maximized number of sales?
94
  
 
Telsers put forth the service theory, which was later used and developed by 
economists such as Bork and Marvel. This theory is based on the notion that 
the manufacturer strives to create intra-brand competition by creating an 
increase of service surrounding the product. He illustrates this way of 
maintaining sales quantity with an increased retail price through the figure 
below. D0 represents the demand with no increase in service present and D1 
represents the demand while extra service, made possible through RPM, is 
available. Through the increase in service, Telser concludes that an increase 
in service creates an increase in demand and therefore creates the shift from 
D0 to D1. An increase in demand makes the sales quantity less sensitive to 
an 
95
 increase in price as shown below.
96
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Through this, Telser shows that the service argument is valid as a reason for 
a manufacturer to use RPM to increase retail prices. The service theory is 
based on the notion, previously mentioned by Bork, that consumers take 
other factors than price into account when making a purchase. The 
manufacturer might want to make the product appealing to a certain group 
of consumers and can do so by encouraging an increase in service. The 
problem with moving intra-brand competition from price to service is that 
the manufacturer needs a method of control. Otherwise one retailer could 
lower retail prices and be what is known as a “free rider” on the other 
retailers marketing and services.
97
 This is where RPM could be used to 
control the retailers and create an incentive to compete on other areas than 
price.  
 
Telser concedes that RPM indeed can be used to sustain a cartel and that the 
use of this practice by a cartel presents problems.
98
 However, as we will see 
below, new research shows that the cartelization argument might be flawed. 
 
 
4.4.5 The Anti-Collusive Effect of Resale Price 
Maintenance 
In recent years, economists have even begun to theorize and experiment 
with the fact that RPM might even have an anti-collusive effect. Economists 
Martin Dufwenberg, Uri Gneezy, Jacob Goeree and Rosemarie Nagel 
carried out an experiment in which they tested the effects of implementing a 
price floor in regard to the joint profits. They found that rather than having 
the traditional thought that minimum RPM created higher joint profits for 
competitors, the answer was the opposite – a price floor actually reduced the 
joint profits for competitors showing that in theory, RPM might be a tool to 
facilitate collusion but in practice, it has an adverse effect on the joint 
competitors.
99
 An excerpt from their abstract can be found in footnote 72.
100
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Regarding to pricing, they also conclude that: 
 
“From the viewpoint of traditional theory, the introduction of price floors in  
Bertrand models protect competitors from making low or zero profits, and 
should thus be anti-competitive. With our experiment we have shown that 
the opposite can be true: the presence of a price floor fostered competition 
and can lead to more competitive pricing.”101 
 
This contradicts the traditional viewpoint, that RPM is beneficial for a 
cartel. This might be hard to comprehend for one not too experienced in 
economics and it is this notion in combination with the theories above that 
will lead us to the conclusions of this thesis. 
 
 
4.5 Curing the Disease by Attacking the 
Sypmtoms 
 
As Rey and Vergé stated, the cartelization argument has been the go to 
excuse for the negative attitude towards RPM in the EU. When used by 
cartels even advocates for the procompetitive side of RPM such as Marvel 
concedes that it has a negative effect on welfare.
102
 However, there seems to 
be a consensus in the economic literature regarding the positive side of 
RPM that even though RPM is a practise that can maintain a cartel, by itself, 
it does not create a cartel. Despite this, there seems to be a fear of RPM 
regarding this very aspect. Looking at the different theories one can discern 
that the existence of RPM can be a sign of a cartel, but this is not so 
conclusive that it can be established as a rule. As shown above, RPM can be 
used in non-cartel circumstances and even provide positive effects on 
competition. What one must realize is that RPM is a symptom of a cartel 
and not the opposite. Cartelization is the main problem that the regulators 
want to attack and they do so by restricting anything with a correlation to 
cartels rather than going after the main issue itself.   
 
That cartelization is a problem and not something that can be easily 
defended regarding its effects on competition is something most economists 
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and lawyers would agree upon. The question is if we really are to limit the 
market from potential tools that could be of benefit. The empirical evidence 
when it comes down to the effects of RPM is not abundant and one could 
argue that in the pursuit of cartels RPM has been unjustly swept along.  
 
Throughout the thesis we have seen a side of RPM that might seem alien to 
a lawyer in the EU. As seen above, the European hostility towards the 
practice might have lessened during the last two decades but the view of 
RPM as detrimental to competition and consumer welfare still stands with 
the presumption of illegality. In the authors view, the lack of a strong 
economic advocate, similar to the Chicago school, has made the 
development much slower, in an economic sense, driven mainly by 
politicians and lawyers even though cooperation with economists has 
existed e.g. in the developments of the public documents surrounding 
Article 101.
103
 To summarize, what one can discern from the theories above 
regarding RPM is that the role it plays in the market is quite ambiguous.  
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5 Conclusion 
The questions this thesis sought to answer was which status consumer 
welfare has in European competition law and how RPM interacts with it. 
Throughout the thesis the author has established a solid role for consumer 
welfare within competition law. It does not have the status that it has in the 
US antitrust system but is still very present, especially at a practical level.  
 
Regarding the second posed question, the author has found is that the 
current legal framework surrounding RPM is not up to date with the 
economic theories in this area. Even though the analysis under 101(3) might 
contain elements of the balancing in the Rule of Reason doctrine the fact 
still stands that RPM is regarded as anticompetitive. Even if one can argue 
that the efficiency defense under 101(3) is enough to conduct a thorough 
economic analysis, we have seen above regarding consumer welfare, that in 
practice, the Commission conducts any discussion behind locked doors and 
can in these, apply their own opinions. While there might exist an equal 
amount of economists that argue for the anticompetitive effects of RPM it is 
the authors view that what one can derive from this is that the nature of 
RPM is truly ambiguous and this should motivate a more balanced approach 
toward the practice. The use of RPM can indeed be anticompetitive but in 
the authors view this does not, in any way validate a presumption of 
illegality. Therefore the status of RPM as a hard core restriction should be 
removed and thereby create more equal burden of proof.  
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